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NO IFS, ANDS OR BUTTS: BIG TOBACCO IS FIGHTING
FOR ITS LIFE AGAINST A NEW BREED OF PLAINTIFFS
ARMED WITH MOUNTING EVIDENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal government has estimated that ten million people
have died of smoking-related illnesses. l That number continues to
grow at a rate of 400,000 deaths per year, making it the number
one preventable cause of death in the United States. 2 Moreover, $50
billion is spent each year in direct medical costs, 3 and over five million years of potential life are lost annually from smoking. 4 One
might expect that cigarettes would be regulated, perhaps even
banned, or that tobacco companies would be held financially liable
for such extensive damages. Instead, tobacco is a $45 billion a year
industry5 that has boasted for decades that it has not paid a dime
for such claims. 6 Since the 1950s, over three hundred consecutive
claims have been defeated by "big tobacco."7 The industry has flourished by selling a product that causes many of its consumers to become sick and even die.
1. See Mark Curriden, The Heat is On, 80 ABA j. 58, 58 (1994).
2. See CDC's Tobacco Information & Prevention Sourcepage (visited Sept. 5, 1997)
<http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/ osh/ tobacco. hUn>.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Henry Weinstein & Jack Nelson, Untested Theory Becoming Tobacco Firms' Top
Threat Courts, LA TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at AI, available in 1996 WL 11255519.
6. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 58. However, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. (Liggett) without admitting wrongdoing, has paid out $1 million as part of a
March 1996 settlement with five states. See Liggett Pays First Part of Tobacco Settlement, WALL ST. j., April 9, 1996, at AI0, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3097975. The
settlement with Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Louisiana provides that Liggett will also pay another $4 million over the following
ten years, as well as 2.5% of the company's pre-tax profits for the next twentyfive years. See Milo Geyelin, Liggett, Five States Set Pact Covering Treatment of
Smoking-Related Illnesses, WALL ST. j., Mar. 18, 1996, at A3, available in 1996 WLWSJ 3095173. The payments are to help defray the cost of treating Medicaid
recipients with smoking-related illnesses. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 246-58, 261-66; see also infra note 278 and accompanying text.
7. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 58.
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This Comment explores the various legal theories utilized by
plaintiffs in the past forty years of tobacco litigation. This Comment
also explains why plaintiffs have been unsuccessful and the tobacco
industry has been victorious. Further, this Comment examines the
most recent battles, including actions brought by states to recover
Medicaid expenses in treating smoking-related illnesses.
In 1996, Maryland joined the fight,S and like many other states,9
Maryland is relying on the growing evidence of internal documents
and insider testimony. This new evidence, in conjunction with lessons learned from past losses, may provide the current army of
plaintiffs with the tools necessary to reach long-awaited success. The
fall of the tobacco industry may be just around the corner.
II.

HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION

A.

First Wave: 1950s

In 1954, in the midst of early studies identifYing a link between
smoking and cancer,IO Eva Cooper began what has been termed
"the three waves" of tobacco litigation 11 by suing RJ. Reynold's Tobacco CO. (RJ. Reynolds) for the wrongful death of her husband.12
Cooper alleged that her husband contracted lung cancer from
smoking Camel cigarettes and that he had relied upon representations in particular newspaper, television, and radio advertisements
stating that Camel cigarettes were healthy and harmless.13 RJ. Reyn8. See Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96122017/CL 211487 (Md., Baltimore City Cir. Ct.) (filed May 1, 1996).
9. See State Tobacco Information Center (visited Sept. 16, 1997) <http:/ /
stic.neu.edu>. The following thirty-eight states have also filed suits to recover
Medicaid expenses: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. Puerto Rico has also filed suit. See
id.
10. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 853, 856 (1992). Early findings were first published in The Journal of the
American Medical Association and later in The Reader's Digest. See id.
11. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 10, at 854. The phrase "three waves" refers to the
more active periods of litigation as follows: (1) 1954 to about 1965, (2) 1983
through 1992, and (3) 1992 to the present. See Elsa F. Kramer, Tobacco Defense
Strategies, REs GESTAE, May 1996, at 24.
12. See Cooper v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 465 (1st Cir. 1958).
13. See, e.g., id. at 466. The alleged representations included that "20,000 doctors
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olds, the manufacturer of Camel cigarettes, easily defeated this theory of deceit l4 by asking Cooper which particular ads were relied on
and showing the court that none of those ads included the alleged
misrepresentations. 15
This result was typical of the first wave cases. During this early
period, only about 150 cases were filed l6 based on various theories,
including deceit,n breach of warranty!8 and negligence}9 Only ten
of these cases went to trial, and every plaintiff was ultimately
defeated. 20
In Lartigue v. RJ Reynolds,21 Frank Lartigue's widow filed suit
against a group of cigarette makers, alleging breach of warranty and
negligence. 22 Lartigue died of lung cancer after fifty-five years of
smoking the defendant's cigarettes. 23 Lartigue's widow alleged a
causal connection between his smoking and his cancer.24 However,
the jury did not agree and sided with the tobacco companies. 25
Lartigue's widow appealed the jury instructions on the nature
of the implied warranty of wholesomeness. 26 The trial judge explained that "such implied warranty does not cover substances in
the manufactured products, the harmful effects of which no developed
human skill or foresight can [avoid}."27 According to these instructions,
if the jury found that the tobacco companies did not foresee that
cigarettes could cause cancer at the time that Mr. Lartigue's cancer
began to develop, the verdict had to be in favor of the companies. 28
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

say that 'Camei' cigarettes are healthful" and that they "are harmless to the
respiratory system." [d.
See id. at 465.
See id. at 466.
See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24; Rabin, supra note 10, at 857.
See, e.g., Cooper, 256 F.2d at 465; see also supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
See Rabin, supra note 10, at 859; see also infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
See Rabin, supra note 10, at 859.
See B&W Loses First Tobacco Liability Case in Fla., SELECI' FEDERAL FIUNGS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 9, 1996, available in WL Fed File, HTH News [hereinafter B&W].
317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
See id. at 22.
See id. Lartigue started smoking Picayune cigarettes, made by Liggett, as a
nine-year-old child; as he got older, Lartigue also smoked Liggett'S King Bee
tobacco and RJ. Reynold's Camel cigarettes. See id.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 22.
See id.
[d. at 39 (alteration in original).
See id.
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this instruction was fair and consistent with Louisiana law. 29 The
court of appeals noted that those who started smoking before the
"great cancer-smoking debate" could not claim reliance on representations that cigarettes had no carcinogenic element. 3o
Similar jury instructions were upheld in Ross v. Philip Morris &
CO.31 In Ross, the plaintiff attempted to recover for his injuries 32 by
asserting breach of implied warranty, negligence, fraud, and deceit
against cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris. 33 In addition to a general denial, Philip Morris asserted as defenses the statute of limitations, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. 34 At trial, the
jury found for Phillip Morris. 35
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of the jury
instructions, arguing that Phillip Morris owed an absolute duty of
wholesomeness, thereby making knowledge and reasonableness irrelevant. 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that strict liability could be imposed under certain conditions. 37 However, under the facts of this case, liability had
been properly limited. 38 As the court of appeals explained, absolute
liability emphasizes that only the manufacturer can know about a
product's contents. 39 However, when Ross began smoking,40 Philip
Morris was in no better position than consumers to know of the
link between cancer and smoking. 41
.
In Green v. American Tobacco CO.,42 plaintiffs came closest to victory during the first wave of tobacco litigation. 43 In Green, a jury
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id.
Id. at 3940.
328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
For nearly twenty years, Ross smoked Phillip Morris's cigarettes, sometimes up
to four packages a day, until undergoing surgery for throat cancer. See id. at 5.
Ross underwent a laryngectomy, neck dissection, and tracheotomy. See id.
See id. The fraud and deceit count was not submitted to the jury because Phillip Morris's motion for summary judgment on that issue was granted. See id.
See id. The statute of limitations defense was eliminated in a pretrial conference. See id. Also, the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses
did not go to the jury. See id.
See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See id.
See id.
In 1934, Ross began smoking only the defendant's cigarettes. See id.
See id.
409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
See Rabin, supra note 10, at 861.
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found that Edwin Green, Sr. died of lung cancer caused from smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes. 44 However, this case spanned more than
a decade and reached appellate courts five times before the applicable state law could be determined. At the center of the controversy
was the implied warranty of reasonable fitness and the applicability
of strict liability. Although the plaintiff established causation,45 the
jury ultimately found for the tobacco company.46 The tobacco company's victory was partially due to the jury instructions47 which provided, like those in Lartigut8 and RoSS,49 that the implied warranty
does not cover substances the company could not foresee as
harmful. 50
On certified question from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of the implied warranty of merchantability.51 The supreme court
found that the manufacturer's "actual knowledge or opportunity for
knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant."52 Without concluding on the particular facts of the case, the
court held that there was no foreseeability limitation on liability
under an implied warranty of merchantability.53 The court also
found that American Tobacco could be found absolutely liable for
breach of implied warranty of fitness of cigarettes, which caused
cancer in the plaintiff, even though the company did not or could
not know of the potential harm. 54
The plaintiff's success on certification was short-lived, however,
because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed one of its prior Green decisions en bane. 55 Relying on the reasoning of an earlier dissent,56 the court held that an implied war44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Green, 409 F.2d at 1167 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
See id. (Coleman, J., dissenting).
See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
See id. at 170. The trial judge instructed the jury that an "implied
does not cover substances in the manufactured product the harmful
which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge."
See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
See supra text accompanying notes 3141.
See Green, 154 So. 2d at 170.
See id.
Id. at 170.
See id. at 172.
See id.
See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969).
See id. at 1166 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing Green v. American
Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968».

warranty
effect of
Id.

Tobacco
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ranty guarantees that a product is "reasonably wholesome or fit."57
Because the product in this case, Lucky Strike cigarettes, was not
defective or adulterated,58 the appellate court held that the manufacturer could not be liable. 59
In addition to issues of implied warranty, first wave juries also
addressed plaintiffs' claims of express warranty. In Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco CO.,60 the jury found that Otto Pritchard's cancer
was caused by smoking cigarettes manufactured by Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. (Liggett). Nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held Liggett was not liable because it
had not made any" 'express warranties upon which the plaintiff relied and by which he was induced to purchase' the cigarettes. "61
Pritchard, like many others, also used a negligence theory
against Liggett. 62 The complaint included allegations that Liggett
represented its cigarettes as safe when they actually contained harmful ingredients that made them unsafe for human consumption. 63
Pritchard contended that because Liggett knew, or should have
known, that substances in the product were cancer-producing, it was
negligent in failing to warn consumers of the potential harms of
smoking. 64
Liggett argued that at the time Pritchard contracted cancer
there was no evidence supporting the theory that smoking caused
lung cancer.65 This debate over the causal link between smoking
and cancer never went to the jury.66 The district court granted Liggett's motion for a directed verdict, holding that "no substantial evi57. Green, 391 F.2d at 113.
58. See id. at 111.
There has never been presented by the evidence any contention that
Lucky Strike cigarettes were more dangerous or had a greater propensity to cause lung cancer than cigarettes bearing other brand
names. Nor has there been any contention that the cigarettes which
Mr. Green smoked contained any foreign substance, or any spoiled,
contaminated or other substandard ingredient which caused his injury and death.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1963).
59. See Green, 391 F.2d at 111.
60. 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966).
61. Id.
62. See id.; see also Ross v. Philip Morris, 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964).
63. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1961).
64. See id. at 299.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 295.
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dence ha[d] been offered to support a verdict against the defendant on any theory of negligence. "67
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the evidence presented a jury question. 68
Thus, the issue of whether it was reasonable for Liggett to have forgone further testing69 on the effects of smoking, and whether Liggett should have warned of cancer-causing ingredients, should have
been submitted to the juryJo On retrial, the jury decided in favor of
Liggett. 7l Liggett successfully persuaded the jury that Pritchard "had
assumed the risk of contracting lung cancer."72
Tobacco companies had traditionally defended smokers' suits
by simply denying all claims made by the plaintiffs and asserting the
statute of limitations. Consistently, tobacco companies had argued
cigarettes did not cause cancer or, alternatively, that they did not
know that cigarettes could cause cancer. 73 As noted above, in Lartigue, RJ. Reynolds denied any causal connection between smoking
and cancer.74 In Rnss, Philip Morris claimed that as a matter of law,
there was insufficient evidence to submit the question of causation
to the jury.75 Nevertheless, Philip Morris did not challenge the jury
instructions which stated that even if the cigarettes caused cancer,
the defendants could not be held liable unless "reasonableness"
and "developed skill or foresight" could have anticipated the
harmJ6
Note that during this first wave of cases the central doctrine
was not causation, but rather foreseeabilityJ7 Although juries found
that the deaths at issue were due to cancer caused by smoking the
manufacturer's cigarettes, they generally decided in favor of the
67. [d.
68. See id. at 300.
69. Evidence existed that Liggett had conducted one test on the effects of smoking on human beings, concluding that their cigarettes had no harmful effect
on "nose, throat and accessory organs." [d. at 300. However, a doctor who examined study participants did note harmful effects from smoking. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 862.
72. [d.
73. See Lartigue v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19,23 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross
v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 10 (8th Cir. 1964); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 23.
75. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 7.
76. [d. at 6-7.
77. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 860·61.
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manufacturers based on the lack of foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiffs. 78 During this time, juries determined that the requisite
human skill and knowledge were not sufficiently developed to provide the insight that smokers could and did contract cancer from
smoking. 79
The conclusions reached by judges and juries during the first
wave illustrate the general lack of understanding regarding the
health risks associated with smoking. The great cancer-smoking debate was only in its early stages and it was believed that smokers
merely assumed the risk of harm. 80 In addition, the general public
widely accepted the notion that tobacco companies lacked the
knowledge that their products caused lung cancer.8l
Little was it known that not only did tobacco companies have
the knowledge that plaintiffs like Pritchard had alleged,82 but that
they took active measures to conceal their findings from the public.
Recent evidence has shown that tobacco company executives, by denying that evidence proved a connection between smoking and cancer, created the atmosphere within which these earlier cases were
heard and lost by plaintiffs. 83 What subsequent plaintiffs learned
from these early defeats was that they would have to produce evidence that the tobacco companies had knowledge of the harmful
effects and concealed it.

B.

Second Wave: 19805

The second wave of tobacco litigation began in the 1980s,84 a
period in which more information linking smoking to cancer became available. 85 Even though another 150 cases were filed, plaintiffs remained unsuccessfu1. 86 Plaintiffs continued to assert many of
the same theories as in the first wave of litigation, such as breach of
warranty. However, they also undertook a new focus with other
theories.
78. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966); see
also supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 3946; Green, 409 F.2d at 1167.
79. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 19; Green, 409 F.2d at 1166.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 72.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 4041.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 215-16, 22744.
84. See B&W, supra note 20; Kramer, supra note 11, at 24.
85. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 864. The Surgeon General's Report of 1964 was released, and legislation requiring warning labels on cigarette packages was enacted. See id.
86. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24.
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In Roysdon v. RJ Reynolds,87 the plaintiffs contended that RJ.
Reynolds's cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous. 88
During the first wave of cases tobacco companies defeated this theory by convincing the fact finder that the harm caused from smoking was not foreseeable. 89 Now, however, tobacco companies combined the foreseeability doctrine with the consumers' increased
level of knowledge to avoid liability.90
In Roysdon, the court explained that under Tennessee law, a defective product was one that is "unsafe for normal or anticipatable
handling and consumption."91 Therefore, consumer knowledge
about the inherent risks of smoking must be considered when determining whether cigarettes are defective. 92 At trial, the Roysdons
did not argue that the cigarettes were incorrectly manufactured or
had dangerous impurities. 93 Thus, the court found that RJ. Reynolds's cigarettes did not pose any risks that were not already known
by consumers.94 Therefore, the product could not be defective. 95
Regarding the Roysdon's claim that RJ. Reynold's cigarettes
were "unreasonably dangerous," the court again found that public
knowledge about the risks and dangers of smoking prevented a
finding in favor of the Roysdons. 96 Under Tennessee law,97 a product is "unreasonably dangerous" if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer with common knowledge would think it to be. 98
The court found that knowledge that "smoking is harmful to health
is widespread and can be considered part of common knowledge. "99
Thus, because the information was available to the Roysdons, the
court held the issue could not go to the jury.l00 Roysdon illustrates a
shift in the use of strict liability by plaintiffs. Rather than focusing
on foreseeability, as was done in the first wave of cases, plaintiffs re87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 232.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-59 for a discussion of Green.
See infra text accompanying notes 91-100 for a discussion of Ruysdon.
Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See [d.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1980), cited in Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236.
See Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236.
[d. (quoting Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192
(E.D. Tenn. 1985».
See id.
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lied on the dangerous nature of the product. 101 While the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Roysdon used the "unreasonably dangerous"
method, others tried to persuade courts to apply the risk-utility
test. 102
In Gianitsis ·v. American Brands, Inc.,103 Nickolas Gianitsis brought
suit against several tobacco companies claiming that he contracted
lung cancer as a result of smoking the defendant's cigarettes. 104 He
attacked the tobacco industry with the risk-utility test l05 which had
been proposed fifteen years earlier in an article by Professor
Wade. 106 Under this doctrine, a manufacturer could be liable for injuries if the product's risks outweigh its social value or usefulness.107
Thus, a plaintiff could maintain a strict liability claim without having to prove a defect in the product. 108 However, the Gianitsis court
did not accept the "expansive doctrine of strict product liability."I09
Although the court found that the plaintiffs claim was consistent
with the risk-utility theory,110 it held that such theory was not recognized under New Hampshire law. 111
A similar result occurred in Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,112 where the court declined to apply the risk-utility test. 1l3 The
Miller court noted that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
mentioned the risk-utility test in a prior case,114 it did not intend to
101. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 866.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08 for a discussion of the risk-utility
test
103. 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988) (applying New Hampshire law).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 855.
106. See id. at 857. Wade proposed that whether a product is defective is more
properly an issue of negligence, while whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a products liability issue. See J. W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825, 837 (1973).
107. See Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 857 (discussing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 649 F.
Supp. 664, 670-71 (D.NJ. 1986» (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 462 A.2d
298 (NJ. 1983».
108. See id.
109. Id. at 859.
110. See id. at 857.
111. See id. at 859. The court found that New Hampshire courts have adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which the court interpreted as requiring an
allegation of a defect. See Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 858.
112. 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
113. See id. at 489.
114. See id; see also Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987). The Lewis
court mentioned three approaches to design defects as follows: (1) the con-
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adopt this approach and would not do so now. 115
During the second wave of cases, the tobacco industry continued to deny that cigarettes were hazardous 1l6 and asserted the "freedom of choice" argument. ll7 Ironically, the tobacco companies used
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, as
amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, (the
Cigarette Acts) 118 to strengthen this defense, as well as advance preemption arguments. 119
In Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp.,120 the Supreme Court of Michigan,
while addressing contributory negligence in an asbestos case, acknowledged that consumers have the freedom to choose, and they
therefore assume the risks resulting from their choices. 121 In Brisboy,
the decedent was an asbestos worker who smoked two packs of cigarettes a day for thirty years and died of lung cancer.122 The jury
found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, as well as his smoking, concurrently caused his fatal cancer.123 The court held that the
"risk of developing lung cancer is within the scope of the risk as-

115.
116.
117.

118.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

sumer expectations standard; (2) the risk-utility standard; and (3) the Azz.arello
standard. See Lewis, 528 A.2d at 593; see also Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 487. Under
the consumer expectation standard, a product may be defective if it does not
perform as an ordinary consumer would expect during normal use. See Miller,
679 F.Supp. at 487. The risk-utility test provides that a product is defective if
the risk of harm outweighs the benefits of the characteristic at issue. See id.
The Azz.arello standard may result in a finding of defectiveness if the product
leaves the manufacturer's control without any feature that makes it safe for its
intended use or with any feature that makes it unsafe for its intended use. See
id.
See Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 489.
See Curriden, supra note I, at 60.
[d.; Kramer, supra note 11, at 24; see Rabin, supra note 10, at 870; see also id. at
873 (explaining that the tobacco companies place responsibility for harm on
the user, instead of the industry, while still denying risk to the user).
See Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 133140 (1994». Four years later, Congress amended the 1965 Act by enacting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. See Pub. L. No. 91-222,
84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 133140 (1994». The 1969
amendments strengthened the warning label language and prohibited advertising in any medium under FCC regulation. See id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 (1992) (explaining the 1969 amendments).
See Curriden, supra note 1, at 60.
418 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1988).
See id. at 655.
See id. at 651.
See id. at 655.
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sumed by a smoker."124 Thus, the decedent's smoking habit constituted negligence. 125 Under the doctrine of comparative negligence,
the defendant, an asbestos manufacturer, would only be liable for
damages causally related to its own negligence. 126
While analyzing the Cigarette Acts, the court in Forster v. RJ
Reynolds Tobacco Co.127 noted that Congress warned people that "they
should not smoke if they value their health but [left] the decision
whether to smoke up to them."128 RJ. Reynolds argued that the Cigarette Acts preempted not only129 Forster's failure to warn claim, but
also any state claim based on defective condition or design. l3O RJ.
Reynolds further argued that permitting such state tort actions
would conflict with the Cigarette Acts' compromise,131 which allows
cigarettes to be sold if they are packaged with the federallymandated warning label. 132 The Forster court held that the Cigarette
Acts impliedly preempted state tort claims based on the duty to
warn,133 but did not preempt other claims to the extent that they
were not based on the duty to warn. l34
In Rite v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco CO.,135 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania also concluded that the Cigarette Acts preempted post1965 claims 136 based on the failure to warn. J37 Much of the court's
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.

132.
133.
134.

135.
136.

[d.

See id.
See id. at 655-57.
437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
[d. at 658.
Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, Congress can preempt state
common law and statutes with federal legislation. See, e.g., Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1243 (NJ. 1990). State law preemption can
occur by express language, implied congressional intent, or to the extent that
state law conflicts with the federal regulation. See id. Instances of conflict preemption include (1) where compliance with both state and federal laws would
be physically impossible and (2) where state law is an obstacle to the purposes
of a federal regulation. See id.
See Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659.
The Farster court interpreted the Cigarette Acts to represent a "compromise
between the national interest in protecting health by not smoking and the national interest in protecting commerce and the country's tobacco economy."
[d. at 658.
[d. at 660.
See id.
See id. at 661-63. Thus, 'Forster's claims of unsafe design, misrepresentation,
and breach of warranty were not preempted. See id.
578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. 1990).
.
"The Act does not specifically provide for retroactive preemptive effect." Far-
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reasoning came from its analysis of the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.138 The Hite court agreed with the Cipollone court's conclusion
that state tort claims alleging violations of warning obligations,
other than those required by the federal act, would conflict with the
Cigarette Acts and disturb the balance created by Congress. 139
Although several courts effectively precluded plaintiffs' claims
by allowing the preemption defense,140 not all courts accepted this
defense. The court in Dewey v. RJ Reynold's Tobacco Co. 141 chose to
conduct its own analysis of the issue 142 rather than relying on previous interpretations. The Dewey court concluded that the Cigarette
Acts did not preempt the plaintiff's claims. 143
The Dewey court acknowledged that many federal circuit courts
approved of the rationale in Cipollone, but noted that some of those
decisions were reversals of lower cour1:$ that had determined that
the Cigarette Acts were not preemptive. 144 The Dewey court concluded that the Cigarette Acts do not expressly, impliedly, or by "actual conflict" preempt state law claims.145 The court found that the
goals of the Cigarette Acts were to (1) inform the public that smoking may be dangerous to one's health by requiring warning labels
and (2) protect commerce and the economy.l46 The court rejected

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.

ster, 437 N.W.2d at 663.
See Hite, 578 A.2d at 420.
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
See Hite, 578 A.2d at 419-20.
See s:upra text accompanying notes 129-34 for a discussion of FQTSter. See supra
text accompanying notes 135-39 for a discussion of Hite.
577 A.2d 1239 (NJ. 1990).
See id. at 1244.
See id. at 1251.
See id. at 1246. See generally, e.g., Forster v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423
N.W.2d 691, 696-701 (1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (finding that
the Cigarette Acts did not "immunize the tobacco industry from tort liability,"
and citing four factors as follows: (1) the Cigarette Acts do not explicitly preempt state court claims, (2) state police powers are involved, (3) the legislative
history of the Cigarette Acts shows that Congress did not intend to preempt,
and (4) preemption would destroy all methods of recourse for plaintiffs).
See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247.
See id. at 1248. The statement of policy and purpose explains:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health whereby-(I) The public may be adequately informed
that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a

112

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

RJ. Reynold's argument that because state tort claims frustrate the
second goal, such an "obstacle" is preempted. 147 Instead, the court
observed that permitting such claims would advance the public policy goals of providing individuals with the opportunity to present
claims and receive compensation where appropriate. l48
III.
A.

TOBACCO LITIGATION TODAY
Third Wave: 1992 to Present

The split on the preemptive effect of the Cigarette Acts l49 was
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc. 150 which marked the beginning of the current, third wave
of tobacco litigation. 151 Rose Cipollone started smoking in 1942 and
died of lung cancer in 1984.152 Her son brought suit against Liggett,
alleging breach of express warranties, failure to warn, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy.153 Liggett contended that the
Cigarette Acts, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 (the 1965 Act) and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969 (the 1969 Act), preempted such claims, thus safeguarding it from liability.154
Prior to Cipollone, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled that the 1965 Act preempted most actions
against tobacco manufacturers after 1965.155 However, as noted by
the Supreme Court, the court of appeals did not specify which of

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

153.
154.
155.

warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1248.
See id. at 1249-50.
See supra note 118 (explaining origins of the Cigarette Acts).
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
See generally Rabin, supra note 10, at 874.
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,' 508 (1992). Rose Cipollone
and her husband filed suit on August 1, 1983. See id. at 509. When she died in
1984, her husband continued the claim until his death after the trial. See id.
Their son maintained the Supreme Court action. See id.
See id. at 508.
See id. at 510. See generally supra note 118 (explaining origins of the Cigarette
Acts).
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Cipollone's claims were preempted. 156 On remand, the district court
complied with the appellate court ruling and prohibited Cipollone
from relying on Liggett's advertising and public relations conduct in
proving his failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud claims. 157 However, even with
these limitations, Liggett prevailed at trial. The jury concluded that
Liggett breached its duty to warn and express warranties before
1966, and thus the jury awarded Cipollone $400,000 in damages. 15s
On appeal, however, the trial court's decision was reversed, and a
new trial was ordered. 159 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the preemption issues regarding the 1965 and
1969 Acts. 160
The Supreme Court issued three distinct holdings. First, the
Court held that state law damage actions were not preempted by
Section 5 of the 1965 Act. 161 Second, the Court determined that the
1969 Act preempted Cipollone'S failure to warn claim. 162 Third, the
Court held that claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy were not preempted by the
1969 Act. 163 In reaching these conclusions, the majorityl64 relied on
a narrow rule of statutory interpretation. 165 The Court looked only
156. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512.
157. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp 664, 673-75 (D.N]. 1986).
158. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 554-55 (3d Cir. 1990), afi'd
in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The jury found Rose Cipollone 80% responsible
for her injuries because she voluntarily smoked cigarettes, which was a known
danger. See id.
159. See id. at 583.
160. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512.
161. See id. at 519-20. However, state and federal rule making bodies were preempted from "mandating particular cautionary statements." [d. at 520.
162. See id. at 524 ("Petitioner's claims are preempted to the extent that they rely
on a state-law 'requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to ... advertising
or promotion.' "). Claims based on Liggett's testing or research, however,
wen~ held not to be preempted. See id. at 524-25.
163. See id. at 531.
164. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for Parts I, II, III, and IV in which
he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice White. See id. at 507. Justice Stevens also wrote a plurality opinion for Parts V and VII, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice White joined. See id.
165. See id. at 517. The Court relied on the principle of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." [d. In statutory interpretation, this means that "Congress[ional] enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted." [d.; see also
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to the express language of the acts 166 "in light of the presumption
against preemption."167
In a dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Souter, stated that he believed the preemption language could not
be interpreted in isolation, but must be read in the context of the
whole statute. 168 Dissenting in part, he turned to the legislative history169 and determined that Congress did not intend "to leave plaintiffs who were injured as a result of cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct without any alternative remedies."17o Therefore, Justice
Blackmun would have held that none of the common-law remedies
was preempted by the 1969 Act. l7l
In a second dissenting opinion Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas concluded that all of Cipollone's common-law claims were
preempted. 172 Justice Scalia explained that the Court erred in applying a narrow rule of construction to the preemption provisions. 173
Instead, the proper rule of construction required that the statutory
language be given its "ordinary meaning."174
Cipollone illustrates the progress made by plaintiffs over the past
two waves of litigation. In Cipollone, the plaintiff was able to fight for
over ten years, taking the industry to the Supreme Court with numerous claims, at a cost of $6.2 million dollars.175 During the first
period, most cases were brought by "frontiersmen," lone personal
injury lawyers 176 who were often ill-prepared and at times found to
be incompetent. 177 These early battles taught plaintiffs that resources needed to be pooled and new theories espoused. 178

George j. Annas, Health Warnings, Smoking, and Cancer-The Cipollone Case, 327
j. MED. 1604, 1605 (1992) (explaining the Court's majority and concurring opinions).
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
Id. at 518.
See id. at 535 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part).
See id. at 539-41 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part).
Id. at 541 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part).
See id. at 542 (Blackmun,j., dissenting in part).
See id. at 548 (Scalia, j., dissenting in part).
See id. at 545-46 (Scalia, j., dissenting in part).
Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
See Curriden, supra note 1, at 59.
See Rabin, supra note 10, at 857.
See id. at 860.
See Curriden, supra note 1, at 60.
NEW ENG.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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Class and State Actions

The pooling of resources is now a more widespread practice.
By combining resources, plaintiffs are now in a better position to
handle the demands placed on them by tobacco company
attorneys. 179
On March 29, 1993, Castano v. The American Tobacco CO.180 was
filed. 181 This class action suit was filed on behalf of all nicotine dependent people in the United States. 182 The broadly defined class,
which potentially included over forty million people,183 was represented by a team of over sixty law firms.l84 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit noted that "the gravamen of their complaint is ...
[a] novel and wholly untested theory"185 based upon new evidence. 186 The plaintiffs alleged that the tobacco companies knew
that nicotine was addictive, and that the tobacco companies not
only failed to inform consumers, but manipulated nicotine levels
with the intent of increasing the addictive nature of their prodUCt. 187 This general theory was the central theme throughout the
causes of actions asserted-fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of warranty, and strict product liability. 188
179. The tobacco industry is notorious for hiring several highly skilled attorneys for
each case, never settling a claim, and creating a mountain of work for plaintiffs. See id. at 59.
180. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).
181. See id. at 548. In May 1996, the class was decertified. See Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). The court of appeals found that
the district court failed to consider the effects of variations in state law and
how such a trial would be conducted. See id. at 740.
182. See Castano, 160 F.R.D at 549. The district court defined the class as:
(a) All nicotine-dependent persons in the United States, its territories, possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, who have
purchased and smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendants;
(b) the estates, representatives, and administrators of these nicotinedependent cigarette smokers; and, (c) the spouses, children, relatives
and "significant others" of these nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers as their heirs or survivors.
[d. at 560-61.
183. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24.
184. See George J. Annas, Tobacco Litigation As Cancer Prevention: Dealing with the
Devi~ 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 304, 304 (1997).
185. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
186. See id. at 748.
187. See Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 548.
188. See id.
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The first class action suit to go to trial, on June 1, 1997, significantly differs from past cases in that the injured parties are nonsmokers.189 The class is comprised of 60,000 non-smoking flight attendants who contend that exposure to second-hand smoke while
working in airplane cabins has caused them to suffer from various
illnesses. 19o The class is asking for $5 billion in damages. 191
The blameless nature of the non-smoking plaintiffs strips the
tobacco industry of its "freedom-of-choice" defense. 192 Instead, the
defendant is expected to argue that other contaminants could have
caused the flight attendants' injuries. 193 The cigarette companies will
also argue that the flight attendants' claims should be tried individually, rather than as a class, because of the numerous differences
among the class members.194
The presiding Florida circuit court judge, however, has decided
to move forward with the trial as a class action. 195 A jury will first decide whether the industry can be responsible for the injuries suffered by the class. 196 If the industry is found liable, then the jury will
evaluate individual claims.197
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi was the first state to sue the tobacco industry in order to recover Medicaid funds that were spent
treating smoking-related illnesses. 198 Since then, thirty-eight more
states, including Maryland, have filed similar suits. l99 The plaintiffs
now are represented by government attorneys working with experienced products liability lawyers in an effort to "establish for the
first time that the tobacco companies have as much [of an] obligation to compensate the states for damages caused by their .product

189. See Donald P. Baker, Nonsmoker's Suit Presents New Challenge for Industry; Tobacco
Makers Can't Use 'Freedom-of Choice Defense,' WASH. POST, May 31, 1997, at A3,
available in 1997 WL 11585888.
190. See id. One named plaintiff, Norma R. Broin, was stricken with cancer which
resulted in the removal of a lung. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 117-26.
193. See Baker, supra note 189, at A3.
194. See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 202 (providing example of tobacco companies asserting the same argument in actions brought by states).
195. See Baker, supra note 189, at A3.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Ct. Hears Tobacco Challenge to Miss Atty Gen'l Suit, SELECfED FEDERAL FILINGS
NEWSWIRES, Sept. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database.
199. See supra note 9.
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as an oil company has for the cost of cleaning up a spill. "200
Plaintiffs hope to achieve success by utilizing a theory of conspiracy. The states contend that since the early 1950s tobacco companies have known that cigarettes are hazardous to the health of
smokers, but suppressed information about the dangers of nicotine
and conspired to prevent the development of a safer cigarette. 2OI
Nonetheless, tobacco companies continue to be armed with several defenses. They contend that states should still be required to
show evidence on an individual basis, as they would in a traditional
personal injury case. 202 If the cases move forward, the tobacco companies have also threatened to depose thousands of Medicaid recipients. 203 Tobacco companies also argue that states are not damaged
because they have received millions of dollars from taxes on cigarettes. 204 Some tobacco companies have even gone so far as to claim
that they have actually saved the states money. Specifically, they
have asserted that Medicaid and Social Security benefits no longer
need to be provided to smokers due to their early deaths.205

a.

Maryland State Action

On May 1, 1996, the State of Maryland filed suit against the tobacco industry seeking $13 billion in damages. 206 The State's complaint sets forth thirteen counts, including fraud and deceit, breach
of warranties, negligence, and strict liability.207 Like other state actions, Maryland is also utilizing a conspiracy count against the industry. Specifically, the State accuses the tobacco companies of entering into an agreement to suppress information on the dangers of
smoking, including the addictive effects of nicotine, and preventing
the marketing of a safer cigarette. 208 In addition to these theories of
liability, Maryland, in its sovereign capacity, also accuses the tobacco
companies of violating state antitrust and consumer protection
acts. 2OO These theories distinguish the State's case from suits brought
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Complaint, supra note 8, Phillip Morris, (No. 96122017/CL 211487); Federal
Claims Asserted, Remand of Maryland Case Improper, Industry Says, MEALEy's LITIGATION REpORT: TOBACCO, July 18, 1996.
207. See Complaint, supra note 8, at 76-99, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017/CL 211487).
208. See id. at 80.
209. See id. at 13.
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by individuals.
In the first count of its complaint, Maryland alleges that the tobacco companies violated Section 13-301 of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act. 210 Section 13-301 proscribes "any unfair or deceptive
trade practice" with respect to the sale of consumer goods. 211 The
State contends that the tobacco companies continue to engage in
"unfair or deceptive trade practices" in their sale and promotion of
tobacco products. 212 The illegal conduct alleged is five-fold: (1) misleading Maryland consumers about the industry's knowledge on the
health effects of smoking; (2) making statements that cigarettes
have a benefit that they do not; (3) misrepresenting their connection to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee/Council for Tobacco Research, claiming it was controlled by independent scientists
when it was actually an industry promotional tool; (4) failing to
state material facts concerning health hazards and the· addictiveness
of nicotine; and (5) promoting the sale of tobacco to minors.213
The tobacco companies are also accused of violating Section
11-204 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act in counts two,
three, and four of the State's complaint. 214 The tobacco companies
are accused of entering a "contract, combination and conspiracy"
that resulted in the restraint of trade and commerce and willfully
monopolizing the cigarette market.215 The conspiracy is said to include the following: (1) an agreement to suppress independent
smoking research; (2) the destruction of research results illustrating
health hazards; (3) public relations campaigns intended to deceive
the public; (4) a joint effort to make false statements to Congress;
and (5) an agreement to stop the development of a "safer" ciga210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id. at 76.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 13-303 (1990).
Complaint, supra note 8 at 76, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017jCL 211487).
See id. at 76-77.
See id. at 79-85.
Id. Specifically, the tobacco companies are accused of violating the Maryland
Antitrust Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-204(a) (1)-(2) (1990). The Maryland Antitrust Act provides:
(a) Prohibited conduct.-A person may not: (1) By contract, combination, or conspiracy with one or more other persons, unreasonably restrain trade or commerce; (2) Monopolize, attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with one or more other persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce within the State, for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing or maintain. ing prices in trade or commerce.
Id.
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rette. 216 At the same time, the State contends suppression of information on the adverse health effects of smoking and development
of a safer cigarette was an exercise of the tobacco companies' monopolistic power. 2I7 Maryland maintains that it has suffered great injury as a result of the industry's anti-trust violations, specifically,
higher rates of illness and death and the costs associated with
them. 218
Maryland and other states alleging antitrust violations and consumer fraud may prevail where plaintiffs invoking common-law remedies have failed. This point is illustrated by the trial court's recent
decision on the tobacco companies' motion to dismiss. The only
counts to survive were the consumer protection and antitrust
claims. 219
As plaintiffs, states avoid the problems of a "blameworthy plaintiff"220 which individuals faced in many earlier suits, making it easier
to focus on the misconduct of the tobacco companies. 221 As Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey, III explained upon filing
Minnesota's action, "[P] revious lawsuits have said the tobacco companies should pay because their products are dangerous. This suit
says they should pay because the conduct . . . is illegal. "222

b.

Minnesota Model

Because the Maryland case is still in its early stages, the parties
should look to the State of Minnesota case223 for an indication of
what lies ahead. Many view the Minnesota claim as a model because
216.
217.
218.
219.

220.
221.
222.

223.

See Complaint, supra note 8, at 80, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017jCL 211487).
See ro. at 85.
See id. at 86.
See State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96122017jCL 211487 (May 21, 1997). The
court dismissed Maryland's common law counts, holding that the State has
"no right . . . to assert claims in its own name against defendants as alleged
tortfeasors for the harm defendants allegedly caused ... to third party smokers." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The court explained that under the doctrine
of subrogation, the State would need to bring such claims in the name of
each individual Medicaid recipient. See ro.
Richard A. Daynard, The Third Wave of Tobacco Products Liability Cases, TRIAL,
Nov. 1994, at 34, 37-39.
See ro. at 39; see also supra note 215.
State of Minnesota, Private Insurer Sue Tobacco Companies, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
1994, at A4, available in 1994 WL 2435397. Minnesota also asserted antitrust
and consumer protection claims. See Complaint, State v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
No. Cl-94-8565 (Minn., Ramsey County Dist. Ct.) (filed Aug. 17, 1994).
See Complaint, supra note 222, Phillip Morris (No. Cl-94-8565).
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it was filed early and is steadily moving forward. 224 So far discovery
has provided Minnesota with more than ten million pages of documents from the tobacco industry, as well as access to databases compiled by tobacco companies' law firms during the defense of prior
suitS. 225 The tobacco companies seek a comparable volume of
paperwork in requesting State Medicaid payment records and
reports. 226
2.

New Evidence

Many of the newly-uncovered documents that states are relying
upon are the result of relatively recent leaks by industry insiders. In
1994, thousands of pages of documents from Brown & Williamson
surfaced. 227 An anonymous source, known only as "Mr. Butts," provided Stanton A. Glantz, Ph.D, at the University of California at San
Francisco, with approximately four thousand pages of information
that spanned thirty years. 228 Representative Henry Waxman, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment,
also possessed many Brown & Williamson documents. 229 In addition,
the estate of a former British American Tobacco officer made other
industry papers available. 230
These valuable documents revealed that Brown & Williamson
has known for over thirty years that nicotine is addictive and smoking can cause cancer.231 Because tobacco companies' research on
the health effects of smoking was often far ahead of the rest of the
224. See Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI.
225. See id. These documents are thought to be copies of those taken by Merrell
Williams, a former paralegal for one of Brown & Williamson's attorneys. See id.
226. See id.
227. See James S. Todd et aI., The Brown and Williamson Documents: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 274 JAMA 256, 256 (1995).
228. See id.
229. See id. Brown and Williamson tried to retrieve these documents from Representative Waxman by obtaining a subpoena from the Superior Court for the
District of Columbia. See id. at 257. However, the subpoenas were later
quashed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See
Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 414-15 (D.D.C. 1994). The judge explained that to accept Brown & Williamson's argument, that the papers were
stolen and therefore should be returned, would go against the law, equity,
and the public interest because the documents may be evidence of the tobacco company's deception. See Stanton A. Glantz et aI., Looking Through a Keyhole at the Tobacco Industry: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 219,
223 (1995).
230. See Todd et aI., supra note 227, at 256.
231. See Glantz, supra note 229, at 219.
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medical community, Brown & Williamson had advance knowledge
of the hazards but decided to hide this information from the publiC.232 Instead, Brown & Williamson and other tobacco companies
chose to tell the public that a connection between smoking and illness had not yet been established.233 For example, in a 1963 memo,
Brown & Williamson's general counsel, Addison Yeaman, stated,
"We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug
effective in the release of stress mechanisms. "234 Over three decades
later, the Chairman and CEO of Brown & Williamson testified
before the Health and Environment Subcommittee that nicotine is
not addictive.235
In addition to documentation, some individuals have also come
forward with potentially damaging information. Jeffrey Wigand, the
former head of research and development at Brown & Williamson,236 has revealed to the media and the Department of Justice that
companies knew that cigarettes were harmful and kept this information from the public. 237 Wigand contends that Brown & Williamson
had knowledge of the addictive nature of nicotine and the health
hazards of many additives. 238 The legal staff at Brown & Williamson
232. See Todd et al., supra note 227, at 256. By the early 1960s, Brown & Williamson
understood that nicotine was addictive. See Glantz, supra note 229, at 220. It
was not until 1979 that the Surgeon General reached the same conclusion. See
id.
233. See Todd et al., supra note 227, at 256.
234. Glantz et aI., supra note 229, at 220; Curriden, supra note 1, at 61.
235. See Glantz et aI., supra note 229, at 220. At these hearings, chaired by Representative Waxman, U.S. Food and Drug Administration Commissioner David
Kessler pointed to evidence of industry use of their research and patents involving nicotine manipulation. See Daynard, supra note 220, at 34. The CEOs
of seven major tobacco companies responded by swearing that they did not
believe nicotine was addictive. See id.
236. See Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at
170, 172. Wigand, who has a Ph.D. in endocrinology and biochemistry, worked
for health care companies such as Pflzer and Johnson & Johnson before becoming a Brown & Williamson employee in 1989. See Elizabeth Gleick, Jeffrey
Wigand Doesn't Live Here Anymore, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 57, available in 1996
WL 8824909. He was flred from Brown & Williamson in March 1993. See Brenner, supra, at 179.
237. See Elizabeth Gleick, Where There's Smoke . .. Jeffrey Wigand is Making Incendiary
Charges about the Tobacco Industry, Which is Out to Bum Him, TIME, Feb. 12, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8824677.
238. See Brenner, supra note 236, at 173. Wigand brought a report from the National Toxicology Program, on the carcinogenic effect of the additive coumarin, to the attention of a Brown & Williamson executive and suggested removing the additive from their products. See id. at 178-79. The executive's
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reportedly sent sensitive documents involving their in-house research overseas and told their staff to avoid making lists or
memos. 239 The company was hiding information that they contended was not true or did not exist.
As the "highest-ranking tobacco executive ever to tum whistle
blower,"24o Wigand is viewed by many plaintiffs as the witness that
can "personalize" allegations against the tobacco companies. 241 An
insider such as Wigand may be better able to convince a jury when
explaining the conduct and motives of a tobacco company.242
All of this evidence will assist plaintiffs with their current battle
that focuses on deceit, fraud, and conspiracy committed by the tobacco companies. 243 As cases progress, more information will be uncovered and shared with other plaintiffs. The Minnesota case has already exposed a 1973 research report from RJ. Reynolds which
states that a competitor's success was the result of 'deliberate and
controlled' nicotine enhancing methods."244 At the University of
California at San Francisco, an archive has been established to
house Brown & Williamson and other tobacco control documents.
Access to these documents is available on the Intemet. 245

3.

Settlement with Liggett

In March 1997, Liggett & Myers Tobacco, the smallest tobacco
company in the United States, entered into a settlement agreement
with twenty-two states that had cases pending against the company
and confirmed the information disclosed by recent leaks.246 Liggett's

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

response was that such action would hurt sales. See id. at 179. On his own initiative, Wigand then investigated other additives and their effects. See id. The research and development concerning nicotine was handled by Brown & Williamson's overseas departments. See id. at 178.
See Brenner, supra note 236, at 177.
Elizabeth Gleick, Tobacco Blues, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 54, available in 1996 WL
8824908.
See id. at 55.
See id.
See Curriden, supra note 1, at 61.
Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI; see also text accompanying note 201.
See Tobacco Control Archives (last modified Aug. 4, 1997) <http://galen.library. ucsf.edu:80 / tobacco>.
See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firm Settles 22 State Suits; Liggett
Group Admits Cigarettes'Dangers, Agrees to Release Data and Testify, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 1997, at AI, available in 1996 WL 11255519. However, Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Minnesota, a plaintiff in the Minnesota suit, has refused to be a
party to the settlement. See id.
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chief executive officer, Bennett LeBow, agreed to make a statement
that smoking causes various diseases, including lung cancer.247 In addition, Liggett conceded that cigarette companies target young people,248 meaning those who are under the legal smoking age.
In addition to these concessions, Liggett agreed to pay twentyfive percent of its pre-tax profits for the next twenty-five years to the
states. 249 The money is to be used to treat individuals with smokingrelated illnesses and for an anti-smoking campaign. 250 The company's cigarette packages are to be labeled with a stronger warning
that states "smoking is addictive."251
What is most valuable to current and future plaintiffs are the
documents Liggett has agreed to release. Liggett will tum over approximately 250,000 pages of documents, some of which implicate
the entire tobacco industry.252 Those documents that involve other
tobacco companies and the "Committee of Counsel,"253 however,
may be protected by the "'joint-defense' privilege."254 Therefore,
rather than turning these documents over to the plaintiffs, Liggett
is sending them to courts in the twenty-two states. 255 Judges will then
decide whether the documents contain non-legal matters or evidence of a crime or fraud, in which case they would not be protected by the privilege. 256
In exchange for Liggett's cooperation, the twenty-two states
have dropped their cases against Liggett. In addition, all present
and future plaintiffs have been barred from suing the company, except for states which have not yet filed suit. 257 These terms also ap247. See Milo Geyelin & Suein L. Hwang, Liggett to Settle 22 States' Tobacco SuitsCompany Agnes to Warn Smokers of Addiction, Turn Over Internal Data, WALL ST. j.,
Mar. 21, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2414032.
248. See id.; Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI.
249. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI.
250. See id.
251. Geyelin & Hwang, supra note 247, at A3.
252. See Milo Geyelin, Liggett Settlement Puts Spotlight On Industry s Top Legal Group,
WALL ST. j., Mar. 24, 1997, at B5, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2414052.
253. The industry contends that the committee was merely a way for a group of inhouse counsel to discuss common legal topics. See id. A 1964 report detailing
tobacco industry operations alleges, however, that the committee determined
various policy issues such as research and public relations. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. The Attorney General of Arizona, Grant Woods, explained that they were not
sure if the prohibition on other suits could work. See id.; see also Geyelin &
Hwang, supra note 247, at A3.
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ply to any company Liggett may merge with, except Philip MorriS.258
The settlement agreement improves the plaintiffs' claims
against the tobacco companies in several ways. Not only are the
damaging admissions coming from a tobacco company, but many
more documents are now available to support plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs will also be able to argue, due to Liggett'S use of stronger
warnings, that other tobacco companies are following a lower standard of care. 259 All this places more pressure on the industry to follow Liggett'S lead and join in an industry-wide settlement. 260
4. Jury Verdict Against Tobacco
The theories of deceit and conspiracy, along with some of the
new evidence, were at the center of plaintiff Grady Carter's case
against Brown & Williamson. 261 The sixty-five year old began smoking prior to the enactment of the federal law requiring warning labels on cigarette packages, and forty-three years later he developed
lung cancer.262 Carter brought suit against Brown & Williamson
based on negligence and strict liability, focusing on allegations that
nicotine is addictive and that tobacco companies misled the public. 263 Carter's charges against Brown & Williamson were strengthened by evidence which included internal Brown & Williamson
documents. 264
Jurors were angered by Brown & Williamson's hypocrisy in
maintaining that smoking was safe while more and more of their
own research revealed that it was in fact harmful,265 What resulted
was the first jury verdict against a tobacco company. Carter was
awarded $750,000. 266 Perhaps this will be the first of many plaintiff
victories in the third wave as a result of the pooling of resources
and newly discovered evidence.
258. See id. Many in the tobacco industry maintain that LeBow's settlement is
merely an attempt to get another tobacco company to take over his failing
company. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at A1.
259. See Geyelin & Hwang, supra note 247, at A3.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 267-77.
261. See B&W, supra note 20.
262. See Annas, supra note 184, at 306.
263. See B&W, supra note 20.
264. See Annas, supra note 184, at 306. This was the first case in which these documents were admitted into evidence. See id.
265. See id. This anger was revealed in interviews with three of the six jurors. See
id.
266. See B&W, supra note 20.
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Proposed National Settlement

In mid-April 1997, an unprecedented effort to end the battle
between plaintiffs and the tobacco industry became public. 267 Tobacco companies, including Philip Morris and RJ. Reynolds, entered settlement talks with an anti-tobacco alliance comprised of
states' attorney generals, plaintiffs' lawyers, and public health advocates. 268 By discussing a possible compromise with plaintiffs, the industry is acting in sharp contrast with its prior stance toward
attackers. 269
On June 20, 1997, the negotiators emerged from discussions to
announce that the tobacco industry and the alliance had reached
an agreement. 270 The tobacco industry agreed to pay $368.5 billion
over the next twenty-five years,271 comply with advertising and marketing restrictions,272 and submit to FDA regulation of nicotine.273
The tobacco companies also agreed to take active and effective measures to reduce youth smoking. 274 In exchange, tobacco companies
267. See Mark Curriden, Litigants Talk Tobacco, 83 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1997).
268. See id. at 21; see also Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, ~Tobacco Verdict Could
Fire Up Negotiations far Liability Settlement, WASH. POST, May 6, 1997, at A9.
269. See supra note 179.
270. See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Pact Calls far Strict Federal Controls,
WASH. POST, June 21, 1997, at AI.
271. See id.; see also Jill Smolowe, Sorry Pardner, nME, June 30, 1997, at 24, 25. Three
hundred and eight billion dollars will be paid to settle the suits brought by
the states and other class actions. See id. at 27. Sixty billion dollars of the settlement is for punitive damages, of which $25 billion will be used for publichealth programs and health coverage for uninsured children. See id. The tobacco companies will also spend $500 million each year to fund anti-tobacco
programs. See id. Many persons are especially surprised at the tobacco companies' agreement to pay $60 billion in punitive damages because it "is tantamount to an admission of moral wrongdoing, a stunning development for an
industry that for 40 years has steadfastly refused to admit any culpability or ac. cept any responsibility." [d.
272. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI. The use of human images and
cartoon characters in advertising is prohibited, as are billboards, product
placements in films, and merchandise with company names or logos. See Smolowe, supra note 271, at 25-27. The agreement also bans cigarette vending machines. See id. at 26.
273. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI; see also Smolowe, supra note 271,
at 25. The FDA is given authority over the ingredients in cigarettes, including
the ability to ban nicotine after the year 2009. See Schwartz & Torry, supra
note 270, at AI.
274. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI. If under-age smoking does not
drop by 30% in the next five years, 50% in seven years, and 60% in ten years,
the industry will be fined $80 million for each percentage point short of the
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received immunity from future class action suits, and payments to
successful individual plaintiffs were limited to $5 billion a year. 275
However, Congress and the President must approve the sixty-eight
page agreement before it becomes law. 276 The agreement may not
receive such backing. Early reviews of the proposed settlement have
already spurred criticism and debate.277
Even with its flaws, the proposed settlement signifies the strides
plaintiffs have made in the long, hard battle against the tobacco
companies. Armed with strong evidence, the coalition of states,
plaintiffs' attorneys, and health advocates has proven to be a tough
opponent for the tobacco industry. Instead of celebrating yet another victory, tobacco companies are contemplating what steps to
take as the possibility of enormous losses becomes increasingly real.
Present day suits are now the cause of true concern for the industry, as they never have been before.

6.

Settlement with Mississippi

The industry'S decision to pay the state of Mississippi $3.6 billion is evidence of the tobacco companies' fears.278 As the July 9
trial date for Mississippi's suit279 was fast approaching, the four largtarget. See id.
275. See id. The industry had been seeking complete immunity from current and
future suits, but this was the cause of much debate and dissention among the
anti-tobacco side. See id. Texas Attorney General Dan Moragels and others
maintained that they would not be a party to a settlement that provides such
immunity to an industry that "ha[s] lied to the public for 40 years." Curriden,
supra note 267, at 21. Although short of blanket immunity, the $5 billion cap
on what can be paid out annually provides the industry with predictability for
stockholders, which has sent up the stock prices of Philip Morris and RJ.
Reynolds. See Smolowe, supra note 271, at 24, 27.
276. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI.
277. See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Fine Print in Tobacco Pact Draws Critics,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at A9; see also Matthew L. Myers, Look at ... The
Tobacco Settlement; Sign It; The Deal Will Save Lives Now-and in the Future, WASH.
POST, June 29, 1997, at C3.
278. See Milo Geyelin, Mississippi Becomes First State to Settle Suit Against Big Tobacco
Companies, WALL ST. j., July 7, 1997, at B8. The companies will pay "3.6 billion
over 25 years and $136 million a year indefinitely thereafter." Id. The first payment of $170 million will be paid July 15, 1997. See John Schwartz & Saundra
Torry, Tobacco Firms, Mississippi Settle; State to Be Paid Nearly $3.4 Billion for Smoking-Related Health Costs, WASH. POST, July 4, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL
1192239.
279. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 277, at AI.
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est tobacco companies28o agreed to settle with Mississippi for what
amounts to be Mississippi's share of the $368.5 billion proposed national settlement. 281 Therefore, even if the national agreement fails,
the industry will never have to face Mississippi's charges in court. 282
The suit that to many was not worth a nickel has now yielded
billions. 283
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the 1950s, the battle against the tobacco industrY began
with plaintiffs seeking recovery under deceit, breach of warranty,
and negligence theories. Most of the first wave cases were easy victories for tobacco companies, but later cases like Green284 made the
fight more difficult.
In cases brought during the 1980s, plaintiffs argued that cigarettes were "unreasonably dangerous" and failed the risk-utility test
of strict liability.285 Again, tobacco companies defeated such attacks
with the "freedom-of-choice" and assumption of risk defenses. 286
During the second wave, tobacco companies also began asserting
preemption defenses. 287
In Cipollone, the preemption issue went before the United
States Supreme Court, which held only failure to warn claims were
preempted,288 bringing us to the current era of litigation. To help
ease the burden and cost of litigation, claims are now brought by
teams of plaintiffs in class actions and state claims. The conspiracy
theories being developed during the third wave are supported by recently uncovered industry documents and insider testimony.289 Most
recently, a jury decided in favor of a plaintiff in Carter v. Brown &
280. Those companies include Philip Morris, RJ. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson,
and the Lorillard Tobacco Co. See id.
281. See Geyelin, supra note 278, at B8. Mississippi is guaranteed payment by the tobacco companies even if the national proposal fails. See Schwartz & Torry,
supra note 246, at AI. If the national agreement becomes law, however, it will
supersede the Mississippi settlement. See Geyelin, supra note 278, at B8.
282. Former attorney general of Maine, James E. Tierney, commented, "If you get
to trial, all the truth comes out-and [the industry] can't stand that."
Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI.
283. See id.

284. 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane).
285. See' supra text accompanying notes 87-115.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26.
287. See supra notes 129-48.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 160-74.
289. See supra notes 227-45.
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Williamson. 290 In addition, the tobacco industry has agreed to a historic settlement proposal with states' attorney generals. 291
Perhaps a more stable and lasting shift in views will place responsibility upon the tobacco companies for the harm inflicted by
cigarettes. However, it must be remembered that when the first
cases went to trial many assumed the tobacco industry would be easily defeated. lnstead, the industry has enjoyed over forty years of
success. Even today, with the changing views of at least one jury and
the industry's openness to compromise, the tobacco companies continue to sway some juries. 292 There is a lot of work ahead before
plaintiffs may achieve their lasting victory, but success now appears
within reach.
Ingrid L. Dietsch Field

290. See supra text accompanying notes 261-66.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 267-75; see also text accompanying notes
278-83.
292. On May 5, 1997, in Connor v. RJ Reynolds, a jury found that the tobacco company was not liable for the death of Jean Connor. See Donald P. Baker, Fla.
Jury Finds RJ Reynolds Not Negligent; Tobacco Firm had Argued Smoking is Personal
Choice, WASH. POST, May 6, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL 10691833. For
over twenty years, Connor smoked up to three packs of cigarettes a day. See id.
She died of lung cancer at the age of forty-nine, six months after filing suit.
See id. Many were surprised at the defeat because of the success of the Carter
case the year before. See id. However, some commentators reconciled the two
verdicts by citing differences in the plaintiffs' behavior. See id. Carter "tried
everything from hypnosis to a nicotine patch to stop smoking." See id. Conversely, Connor admitted knowledge of· the health risks associated with smoking and did not try to quit until she was told she had cancer. See id. Others
point to industry documents that were considered by the Carter jury, but were
kept out in Connor. See id. As Matthew L. Myers of Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids stated, "We've entered a new era in which plaintiffs will win some and
companies will win some ... without either side dominating the other." Id.

